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THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NOTICE PROVISION
OF THE TEXAS PROBATE CODE
by Hugh E. Hackney
The idea that every man is entitled to his day in court and that he
should be given fair notice of this right was not initially inherent in pro-
bate proceedings.1 Prior to the seventeenth century, death itself was con-
sidered to put the interested parties on notice of the probate proceeding
since the entire family or clan was usually located in a single community.
During the seventeenth century in England, the probate proceeding was
placed in the hands of the ecclesiastical courts and notice was given to the
parties if and when the courts decided to give it.' This concept of notice
was brought to the United States by the English colonists and in many
areas has remained basically unchanged until the present time. The gen-
eral concept of fair notice began to change, however, in the twentieth cen-
tury. This trend culminated in a landmark decision by the United States
Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,4 which
held that the notice given must, "under all circumstances ... apprise inter-
ested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections." 5 Since Mullane involved an in rem proceeding,
in which service of process by publication had traditionally been deemed
to satisfy due process requirements, many states have changed the notice
provisions of their probate codes to comply with its holding.! However,
several states, including Texas, have retained archaic systems of notice
based on the early English legal traditions.7 While arguments may be
made for the validity of the old law, the more reasoned approach is that
such a system is not only outmoded but is violative of modern constitu-
tional concepts of due process of law.' The states with such statutes soon
may find that sister states will not grant full faith and credit9 to their
probate decrees. Similarly, both resident and nonresident interested parties
may collaterally attack the jurisdiction of the court entering a decree
which affects their personal rights. This Comment will examine the ques-
tion of whether Texas may maintain its present probate notice provision
or whether it must adopt, either by legislative enactment or judicial in-
terpretation, a standard of notice comparable to that required by Mullane.
I. THE MULLANE DOCTRINE: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECT
Pre-Mullane. It is necessary to look to the cases decided before Mullane in
'Comment, Probate Proceedings-Administration of Decedents' Estates-The Mullane Case and
Due Process of Law, 50 MICH. L. REv. 124, 130 (1951).
2 Id.
8A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, THE LAW OF WILLS 19-180 (1928); Comment, supra note 1, at
130.
4339 U.S. 306 (1950).
5 Id. at 314.
6 See text accompanying notes 77-83 infra.
I See text accompanying notes 49-60, 64-76 infra.
8 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
'U.S. CONST. art. IV, S 1.
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order to obtain a true picture of how the doctrine of fair notice has de-
veloped. Two cases illustrate that the concept of "best possible notice" was
initially argued in actions against domiciliaries where notice by publication
had formerly been deemed sufficient to meet the requirements of due pro-
cess. The case which served as the basis for Mullane is McDonald v.
Mabee,'o a 1917 case originating in Texas. A party domiciled in Texas left
the state intending to make his home elsewhere. His family, however, re-
mained in Texas. During his absence an in personam action on a promis-
sory note was brought against him and service in the action was by publi-
cation in a Texas newspaper after his final departure. Based on this service,
a personal judgment was sustained by the Supreme Court of Texas.' The
United States Supreme Court overruled the state court and held that "an
advertisement in a local newspaper is not sufficient notice to bind a person
who has left a state, intending not to return. To dispense with personal
service the substitute that is most likely to reach the defendant is the least
that ought to be required if substantial justice is to be done.""' The Court
added that a sister state is not obliged to give full faith and credit to a
judgment which is void in the state where it was rendered." McDonald v.
Mabee involved an in personam judgment; yet it seems to be a forerunner
of Mullane if Mr. Justice Jackson's words are taken at face value.'
The idea that notice must meet the tests of fair play and substantial
justice was carried forward in 1940 in the case of Milliken v. Meyer,"
another in personam action. The dispute concerned an interest in profits
from Colorado oil royalties. A Wyoming court rendered a judgment
against Meyer who was domiciled in Wyoming and who had been personal-
ly served with process in Colorado pursuant to the Wyoming statutes."
Milliken sought to have the Wyoming judgment given full faith and credit
in Colorado. Meyer then brought suit in Colorado alleging that the Wyo-
ming judgment was a nullity for want of jurisdiction over his person or
property. The Colorado court refused to give full faith and credit to the
Wyoming holding.' On appeal to the United States Supreme Court it was
held that "if the Wyoming Court had jurisdiction over Meyer, the hold-
ing by the Colorado Supreme Court that the Wyoming judgment was void
because of an inconsistency between the findings and the decree was not
warranted."'" The Court stated that domicile in a state is sufficient to
bring an absent defendant within a state's jurisdiction for a personal judg-
ment based on the appropriate substituted service. The Court further held
that: "Its adequacy so far as due process is concerned is dependent on
20243 U.S. 90 (1917).
" 107 Tex. 139, 175 S.W. 676 (1915).
1"243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917).
'I ld. at 91.
14 "[W]e think that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
do not depend upon a classification for which the standards are so elusive and confused generally
and which, being primarily for state courts to define, may and do vary from state to state." Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950).
12311 U.S. 457 (1940).16 Wyo. R. CIv. P. 4 (e) (6), 4 (1) (19 59).
"Meyer v. Milliken, 101 Colo. 564, 76 P.2d 420 (1937); Meyer v. Milliken, 105 Colo. 532,
100 P.2d 151 (1940).
" Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940).
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whether or not the form of substituted service provided for such cases and
employed is reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the pro-
ceedings and an opportunity to be heard."' 9
Mullane. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank F Trust Co." involved a New
York trust company which had exclusive management and control of a
common trust fund under New York law." The assets of many small
trusts were to be invested by the company in the common fund, and the
beneficiaries of the small trusts were both residents and nonresidents of the
state of New York. The company petitioned under the statute for a
judicial settlement of accounts which would be binding and conclusive as
to any matter therein upon everyone having any interest in the common
fund or in any participating trust. The only notice of this action given to
the beneficiaries was by publication in a local newspaper pursuant to the
New York Banking Law.2 The newspaper publication merely set forth
"the name and address of the trust company, the name and date of the
establishment of the common trust fund, and a list of all participating
estates, trusts or funds." 3 The appellant appeared specially and contended
that "the statutory provisions for notice to [the] beneficiaries were inade-
quate to afford due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and there-
fore that the court was without jurisdiction to render a final and binding
decree." 4 The appellant's objections were entertained and overruled by the
surrogate court on the grounds that the required notice had been given
and that such notice was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due
process of law." Following an affirmation of the holding by the appellate
division of the supreme court" and the court of appeals of the state of
New York,"' the United States Supreme Court considered the case on
appeal.
The Court began its opinion by stating that "American courts have
sometimes classed certain actions as in rem because personal service of pro-
cess was not required, and at other times have held personal service of
process not required because the action was in rem."" The discussion of the
various distinctions between in rem, quasi in rem, and in personam, halted
abruptly when the Court stated that "in any event we think that the re-
19 Id. at 463.
20339 U.S. 306 (1950).
2
1 Law of July 1, 1950, § 100-c N.Y. Banking Law (amended 1951).
"2Law of July 1, 1950, § 100-c(12) N.Y. Banking Law (amended 1951) states:
After filing such petition the petitioner shall cause to be issued by the court in which
the petition is filed and shall publish not less than once in each week for four succes-
sive weeks in a newspaper to be designated by the court a notice or citation addressed
generally without naming them to all parties interested in such common trust fund
and in such estates, trusts or funds mentioned in the petition, all of which may be
described in the notice or citation only in the manner set forth in said petition and
without setting forth the residence of any such decedent or donor of any estate,
trust or fund.
"83 3 9 U.S. 306, 310 (1950).
1
4 Id. at 311.
25 75 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1947).
2e 88 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1949).
" 299 N.Y. 697, 87 NXE.2d 73 (1949).




quirements of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution do
not depend upon a classification for which the standards are so elusive
and confused generally and which, being primarily for state courts to de-
fine, may and do vary from state to state."2 The Court reasoned that re-
gardless of whether the proceeding is in rem or in personam the parties
should be provided the full opportunity to appear and be heard. Thus, in
balancing the state interest in a speedy, orderly notice provision against
the individual interest sought to be protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment,0 the Court reasoned that the fundamental requisite of due process
of law is the opportunity to be heard and that the right to be heard is of
little value unless adequate notice is given. " The Court held that the New
York statute violated the fourteenth amendment in that it deprived the
known beneficiaries of substantial property rights by its failure to give
adequate notice. Notice must be reasonable and it must be the best possible
under the circumstances of each case."
Post-Mullane. The logical process of extending the Mullane doctrine to
other areas of law was initiated by the Court in Walker v. City of Hutch-
inson' and Schroeder v. City of New York.,' two in rem proceedings in-
volving notice in suits for the condemnation of land. In Walker the city
filed an action to condemn a part of the appellant's land for public use
under the applicable statute.' No notice of a hearing was given except by
publication in the city newspaper although the owner was a resident of the
state in which the hearing was held and his name and address were avail-
able to the city. Reasoning from the fourteenth amendment, the Court
extended the Mullane decision to state residentsa in eminent domain pro-
ceedings by holding that due process requires that an owner whose prop-
erty has been taken for public use must be given a hearing to determine
just compensation. Observing that the right to such a hearing is meaning-
less without notice, the Court applied the Mullane doctrine which requires
that notice must be of a type which reasonably informs parties of pro-
ceedings which may adversely affect their legally protected interest.
Measured by the principles stated in the Mullane case, we think that the no-
tice by publication here falls short of the requirements of due process....
Nothing in our prior decisions requires a holding that newspaper publication
20339 U.S. at 312.
30 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1 states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within the jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
(Emp hasis added.)
3 See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
3 See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914);
Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604 (1914); Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900).
as352 U.S. 112 (1956).
34 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
'Law of March 29, 1937, ch. 227, § 1, Kan. Laws (repealed 1963).
2" States have often felt that they could take greater advantage of their own residents than of
nonresidents. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115-16 (1956).
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under the circumstances here provides adequate notice of a hearing to de-
termine compensation."
The Court has continued to expand the notice requirement over the past
decade. In Schroeder" the Court reaffirmed the reasoning used in Walker
and cited several cases as authority for its position." The case again in-
volved compensation for property acquired by a city government and the
failure to give the appellant proper notice of the proceedings. The lan-
guage used by the Court emphasized its determination to extend the four-
teenth amendment concept of due process to the area of eminent domain.
"The general rule that emerges from the Mullane case is that notice by
publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name and address
are known or very easily ascertainable and whose legally protected interests
are directly protected by the proceedings in question."'"
While the Mullane doctrine had been extended to residents of the
forum state in suits involving eminent domain, the Court used a Texas
case to extend the doctrine of sufficient notice to an adoption proceeding
which has been considered an in rem action.41 In Armstrong v. Manzo' a
husband and wife were divorced by a Texas court. Custody of the couple's
child was granted to the mother; the father was ordered to pay child sup-
port. The mother married the respondent and two years later he sought to
become the child's adoptive father. Texas law requires the natural father's
written consent for adoption, but an exception exists if he has not con-
tributed to the child's support for two years commensurate with his abil-
ity.4" The proper affidavit and petition for adoption were filed, but no
notice of the proceedings was given to the father even though his where-
abouts was well known to the respondents. An adoption decree was entered
and the father sought to annul the decree on the ground that it was en-
tered without notice. The Texas court of civil appeals upheld the decree."
The United States Supreme Court held that the decision of the Texas
court deprived the father of his constitutional rights because "the notice of
the pending adoption proceedings violated the most rudimentary demands
of due process of law."'
While the Texas court recognized the rule in Mullane, it felt that the
infirmity created by the failure to give notice to the father had been
cured by the subsequent hearing afforded him upon his motion to set
37352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956).
38371 U.S. 208 (1962).
9 Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); New York v. New York, N.H. &
H.R.R., 344 U.S. 293, 296 (1953); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314, 318 (1950); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385
(1914); Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604 (1914); Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900).
40371 U.S. 208, 212-13 (1962).
4"Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Adoption of Armstrong, 371 S.W.2d 407 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1963), error ref. n.r.e.; H. CLARK, DoMEsnc RELATONS 608 (1968). The better view
would be to consider adoption a status over which the court could acquire jurisdiction. This view
has not been popular in the United States although it has been discussed in some cases. See Williams
v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297-98 (1942).
0380 U.S. 545 (1965).
' If the nonsupport element is present, the juvenile court judge in the county of the child's
residence may give his approval for adoption. TEx. REv. Csv. STAT. ANN. art. 46a, § 6 (1969).
""Adoption of Armstrong, 371 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), error ref. n.r.e.
' Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965).
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aside the decree." However, this reasoning is subject to attack on the
ground that the respondents would have had the burden of proving their
case against the father's defenses if he had appeared in the original pro-
ceeding. Instead, the burden of proof was placed on the father to over-
come a decree entered by one judge based on a finding of nonsupport made
by another judge." Thus, the problem of the shifting burden of proof can
defeat any curative measures which are argued to correct the shortcom-
ings of the statute."
II. THE TEXAS PROBATE CODE PROVISION
Reasoning similar to that used in Walker v. City of Hutchinson and
Armstrong v. Manzo could clearly be used by the United States Supreme
Court to extend the Mullane requirements of adequate notice to probate
proceedings should the opportunity arise. Nevertheless, the Texas legisla-
ture and judiciary have not seen fit to anticipate such a decision and have
elected to maintain the present notice provision of the Probate Code."'
The provision states: "When an application for the probate of a written
will produced in court, or for letters of administration, is filed with the
clerk, he shall issue a citation to all parties interested in such estate, which
citation shall be served by posting . . . ,,"" The citation itself states that the
application has been filed, the names of the deceased and the party who is
the applicant, the time the application is to be acted upon, and that any-
one interested in the estate may appear and challenge the application."
The notice provision of the Probate Code has been considered by the
Texas courts on a number of occasions. However, the actual question of
whether or not the provision violates the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment apparently has not been raised. Although the notice
provisions of the Probate Code were not directly in issue in the 1950 deci-
sion in Nass v. Nass," the Texas supreme court clearly defined the guide-
lines to be followed in the consideration of the "notice by publication"
provisions of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure." The court observed
that notice by posting or publication is inexpensive and stated that "the
rules governing the issuance of writs and process were cumbersome, and
in many instances several alias citations had to be issued before service was
46 Id. at 551, quoting Adoption of Armstrong, 371 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), error
ref. n.r.e.
47380 U.S. at 551.
4 An analogy can be drawn to probate in Texas on the point of the shifting burden of proof.
Case law has held that the burden of proof prior to a probate proceeding is placed upon the pro-
ponent of the will. Seigler v. Seigler, 391 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. 1965); Watson v. Watson, 340
S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), error dismissed. Once the will has been probated the burden
shifts and is placed on the one who is contesting the validity of the will in the district court.
Chalmers v. Gumm, 154 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1941); Friedrichs v. Reinhardt, 370
S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Robinson v. Compton, 313 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958);
Jordan v. Virginia Military Institute, 296 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Kelso v. Hawkins,
293 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956), error ref. n.r.e.; Cryer v. Duren, 164 S.W.2d 752 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1942); Howley v. Sweeney, 288 S.W. 602 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
4
"TEx. PROB. CoDE ANN. § 128(a) (1956).
so Id.
.1 Id.
52 14 9 Tex. 41, 228 S.W.2d 130 (1950).
5
"TEx. R. Civ. P. 15, 101, 118 (1967).
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obtained as required by law. By the adoption of Rules 15 and 101 the
procedure was simplified and the cost to litigants materially reduced . ... ""
The court went on to equate the civil notice provisions with those of the
Probate Code.
The notice provisions of the Code were specifically challenged in Mit-
chell v. Mitchell," a 1950 case decided by a court of civil appeals. The at-
tack was based on an allegation that notice by posting was an insufficient
means of notification. An amended application for probate had been
filed with the county clerk who issued a notice directed "To any Sheriff or
Constable within the State of Texas."5 ' The sheriff received the notice the
day it was issued and executed it by posting a copy for ten days. The
notice stated that the amended application would be heard "at which time
all persons interested in said estate are required to appear and answer said
application should they desire to do so."5 The court expressly rejected
Mitchell v. Rutter,"s a 1949 court of civil appeals decision, and held that a
notice which was addressed to the sheriff or constable of the county in
which the probate proceeding was pending was valid."s Thus, it would ap-
pear that the issue of the validity of Texas notice procedure in probate was
settled in Mitchell v. Mitchell. This decision continues to be the law in
Texas today."
III. THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF OTHER STATES
Texas does not stand alone as a state whose Probate Code notice provi-
sion is in apparent violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. A number of other states also have provisions which fail to
meet the standards of fair notice as defined by the Supreme Court in
Mullane."5 In contrast, there are jurisdictions which have adopted statutes
which follow the constitutional standards set forth in Mullane.2 A third
group of states have valid statutes, but interpret them in such a manner
as to render them violative of due process."
Statutes Violative on Their Face. A state representative of the group whose
statutes are violative of due process on their face is Iowa. Its statute is akin
54149 Tex. 41, 44, 228 S.W.2d 130, 131 (1950).
55 233 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
5S1d. at 188.57 Id. at 189.
58 221 S.W.2d 979 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). Rutter held that notice to the children of the
deceased in a probate proceeding by posting was invalid and that the children were not subject
to a probate they did not know about. The court, citing City of Corpus Christi v. Scrugg, 89
S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), stated: "The general rule is that statutes relating to service of
process are mandatory and that a default judgment based upon a citation and service not complying
with the statutes is void where the defect is apparent upon the face of the record." 221 S.W.2d
at 980-81.
59 233 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
60 Fortinberry v. Fortinberry, 326 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), error ref. n.r.e.
65 ARtK. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-2107, -2110, -2112 (1967); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-206 (1948);
IOWA CODE 5 633.293 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. §5 394.180, 394.220 (1969); LA. CODE Cxv.
Psoc. ANN. arts. 2857, 2932, 2971 (West 1961); Miss. CODE ANN. § 503, 505 (1957); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 30-217, -1904 (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-253 (1962).5 MIcH. CoMP. LAWS 5 701.32 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 11.76.040 (1967).
aN.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (1954); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-207 (1955).
[Vol. 23
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to the Texas provision, except that notice by publication is substituted
for the notice by posting found in the Texas Code. The Iowa statute
states:
Upon the filing of a petition for probate of a will, the date for proving it
shall be fixed by the court or the clerk, and the clerk shall give notice ad-
dressed TO ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN, signed by him, of such time
fixed, by one publication in a daily or weekly newspaper published in the
county where the will is filed, the publication to be at least seven days prior
to the time fixed for such hearing."
The Iowa statute was challenged in the case of In re Pierce's Estate.65
The question considered by the court was whether the Iowa statute gave
adequate notice to the heirs. The court held that an order admitting a
will to probate after the clerk of the district court prescribed notice of
the time fixed for probate by one publication in a daily newspaper and
the posting of notices in three public places did not violate due process.
"We think the Mullane decision does not require a holding that the order
for notice and likewise Code section 633.20 [New 633.293] which au-
thorizes such a notice, as well as the admission of the will to probate, were
void for lack of due process."" The court reasoned that the provision was
constitutional because the heirs could institute original proceedings to set
aside the order of the probate court at any time within two years from
the time the will was filed for probate. This reasoning, however, fails to
remedy the violation created by the unconstitutional statute."'
South Carolina's statute " provides for the probate of a will without any
notice whatsoever being given to the interested parties. The code does con-
tain a curative provision,9 but this law meets the same argument that was
made in Armstrong concerning the shifting burden of proof."° The statute
provides:
Without citing or calling before him such as have interest, the judge of
probate may (a) examine one or more of the subscribing witnesses thereto,
(b) may take proof of the handwriting of the testator and one of the sub-
scribing witnesses in case of their death or their removal from the State or
when their whereabouts are unknown or (c) may receive any other secondary
evidence admissible and sufficient by the rules of common law and if such
proof shall satisfy the judge of probate that the paper is the last will and
testament of the deceased he shall admit it to probate in common form.71
There is little doubt that the statutes of Iowa and South Carolina fail to
meet the minimum standards of due process of law. In upholding a statute'
similar to that of Iowa the Washington supreme court in In re Sheuws
Estate7 ' held that "[t]he Mullane case was a proceeding in personam in-
64IOWA CODE § 633.293 (1964).
65245 Iowa 22, 60 N.W.2d 894 (1953).
66 60 N.W.2d at 897.
67 See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
"aS.C. CODE ANN. § 19-253 (1962).
69Id. 5 19-255.
7 See text accompanying notes 46, 48 siepra.
"S.C. CODE ANN. S 19-253 (1962).
'WASH. REV. CODE § 11.76.040 (1967).
7'48 Wash. 732, 296 P.2d 667 (1956).
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volving trust funds held in a fiduciary capacity. The proceeding herein
is in rem."74 Such a statement, however, is not supported by the language
of the Court in Mullane;"5 it is in fact, a direct misinterpretation of the
Mullane language. The Washington statute has recently been amended
by adding a provision calling for notice to be given to all interested per-
sons whose names and addresses are known."6
Statutes Constitutional on Their Face. While some states' notice provisions
do violate the fourteenth amendment concept of due process, other states
have adopted statutes which follow the constitutional standards. Michigan
was one of the first to adopt the Supreme Court guidelines in 1951, and
its statute" can serve as a model for those states whose codes are in need
of reform. The statute provides for service of process by delivery to the
person by registered mail or by publication. This statute certainly provides
for the best notice possible under the circumstances. The case of Daft v.
John & Elizabeth Whiteley Foundation" discussed the requirements of
notice in Michigan. The court held:
Despite the fact that in many states wills may be probated without the ne-
cessity for notice to the heirs at law or other interested parties, it being a
proceeding in rem, and not in personam, in others including Michigan, the
74 Id. at 669.
" See text accompanying notes 28, 29 supra.
" WASH. REV. CODE § 11.76.040 (1967).
77 MICH. COMp. LAWS § 701.32 (1968) reads as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by law, all probate and other legal notices required by
law or by the probate judge of any county to be served upon any party, shall be served
as the court shall direct; either
(a) By delivering a copy of the same at least 5 full days before the day of hearing
personally to such party if he can be found within the county, and in case personal
service in the manner provided in this subsection is required, the order shall also
specify the names of all persons upon whom such service shall be made; or
(b) By publishing once in each week for 3 weeks consecutively in some newspaper
printed and circulating in the county where said probate judge holds court, if there
be one printed and circulating in said county; and in case there be no newspaper
printed and circulating in said county, then some newspaper published in an adjoining
county and circulating in the county where the proceedings are pending: Provided,
however, that the last day of publication shall be at least 2 full days prior to the
date set for hearing in such order and notice: Provided further, That if any attorney
shall have entered his appearance in writing for any party in any matter pending in
said court, all notices required to be given to said party in said matter shall be served
on said attorney, in the same manner as provided for service of pleadings in suits
pending in circuit court, and such service shall be in lieu of service upon the client
for whom said attorney appears.
In all cases where notice has been given solely by publication, as aforesaid, copies
of such notice shall be sent by the petitioner, fiduciary or his attorney by registered
or certified mail, with return receipt demanded, at least 14 days prior to the time
appointed therein for hearing; to all persons appearing at the time of such mailing
from the records.of the estate or proceeding with respect to which such notice is given
to have an interest therein, and such copies shall be mailed as aforesaid to the persons
entitled thereto at their respective last known addresses: Provided, however, That
such service by registered or certified mail may be dispensed with whenever the names
or addresses of such interested persons are unknown and cannot be ascertained by the
exercise of reasonable diligence or whenever such interested persons are unborn, un-
ascertained or have only contingent future interests, or have signed a petition for an
order of said court with respect to which such notice by registered or certified mail
would otherwise be required, or by writing filed in said court have waived such
notice; or
(c) Solely by registered or certified mail in the manner above provided where the
names and addresses of the persons required to be served are known.
7' 365 Mich. 6, 108 N.W.2d 893 (1961).
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governing statutes require some sort of notice. . . . [I]n a petition that the
will be admitted to probate, the petitioner must state the names and addresses
of heirs . . . if known.79
Many states, like Michigan, have gone farther and extended notice not
only to nonresidents, but to residents as well." Washington has amended
its statute to meet the requirements of due process by adding to its former
provision" a paragraph which does not distinguish between residents and
nonresidents. This method of reform appears to be the most desirable.
A need for uniformity to insure adequate notice in probate proceedings
is evident. A state statute should at least meet the minimum requirements
of due process with regard to nonresidents as stated in Mullane. The fact
that the statute may violate the due process clause of the state constitu-
tion 2 and may fail to provide adequate notice to residents of the state
was not considered in Mullane. The Mullane doctrine applies the protection
of the due process clause of the Federal Constitution only to nonresidents
of a state."' The later eminent domain and adoption cases extend it to the
residents of a state, and most new state statutes on notice contain this ex-
tension.
States Which Interpret Statutes in a Violative Manner. At least two states
have attempted to provide notice in accordance with due process by
statute yet have failed to do so because their courts have interpreted
the statutes unconstitutionally. 4 The New Mexico statute provides for
notice in a constitutional manner.
If it shall appear from the affidavit of the person producing the will for
probate or otherwise from the files in said proceeding that any of the in-
terested parties are non-residents of the state of New Mexico, a copy of such
notice of probate shall be mailed to each of those whose residence is shown
in such affidavit or can be otherwise ascertained from the files in such pro-
ceeding, at least ten (10) days before the date of hearing. Proof of personal
service of such notice shall be made by the certificate of the officer serving
the same or by affidavit of the person serving the same when such service is
made by a private person, or by acceptance of service filed in the proceed-
ing, signed by the party to be served, if not a minor. Proof of publication
and mailing shall be made in the same manner as in actions brought in the
district court.8
'9 108 N.W.2d at 895, citing Simes, The Administration of a Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding
in Rem, 43 MICH. L. REv. 675 (1945).
"°See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1200 (West 1956); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROc. § 1409 (McKinney
1967).
" The new paragraph reads:
Whenever a final report and petition for distribution, or either shall have been filed in
the estate of a decedent and a day fixed for the hearing of the same, the personal
representative of such estate shall, not less than twenty days before the hearing, cause
to be mailed a copy of the notice of the time and place fixed for hearing to each
heir, distributee, and, in addition, in the case of a will, to each person named therein,
whose names and addresses are known to him, and proof of such mailing shall be
made by affidavit and filed at or before the hearing.
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.76.040 (1967). Some states make this distinction, but it has been demon-
strated that it is an invalid one. See notes 35, 37, and accompanying text supra.
" E.g., TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19.
' Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 311-12, 320 (1950).84 N.M. STAT. ANN. 55 30-2-4 to -6 (1953); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-207 (1956).
8N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-6 (1953).
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The New Mexico case of In re Towndrow's Wills is illustrative of an
improper interpretation of a well drawn statute. In a proceeding to con-
test a will on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to enter an
order admitting the will to probate, no personal notice was given to the
testatrix's nonresident heirs as was required by the statute." Disregarding
the statute, the New Mexico supreme court presumed that the names did
not appear in the proponent's affidavit and could not be ascertained from
the file of the probate proceedings. Therefore, the published notice given to
the nonresident heirs was deemed sufficient. While the statutory provision
is clearly constitutional because of a provision which follows it,8" the case
demonstrates how a court can interpret a statute in a manner which de-
prives it of its validity.
Another interesting point found in the Towndrow case is the statement
by the court that "the giving of notice is not a jurisdictional requirement ""
in New Mexico even though the statute contemplates that notice should
be given. The reasoning is based on the fact that the proceeding in probate
is an in rem action. The judgment is not void for failure to give notice but
rather voidable."M The statute should be strictly followed so that the right
to contest the will may not be lost due to a lack of notice. This state-
ment by the court does not seem to be above argument, however, since
the proceedings in Walker and Schroeder9 were in rem, and in these cases
the United States Supreme Court stated that notice was a jurisdictional
requirement.
Tennessee has a similar statute" which provides for adequate notice. The
statute is an example of careful planning, yet it too has been victimized by
judicial interpretation. The leading case concerning notice in Tennessee,
Brown v. Harris,"' appears to minimize an important aspect of the state
statute. The court held that, although parties in interest who had no no-
tice ought not to be denied their right to contest, the probate should not
be set aside merely because of the absence of process or notice from the
record when the want of notice is not averred in the petition." Thus,
Tennessee, like New Mexico, appears to vitiate the strict notice require-
ments of its probate code.
'647 N.M. 173, 138 P.2d 1001 (1943).87 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (1953).
88Id. S 30-2-6 states:
If it shall appear from the affidavit of the person producing the will for probate or
otherwise from the files in said proceeding that any of the interested parties are non-
residents of the state of New Mexico, a copy of such notice of probate shall be mailed
to each of those whose residence is shown in such affidavit or can be otherwise ascer-
tained from the files in such proceeding, at least ten (10) days from the date of
hearing. Proof of personal service of such notice shall be made by the certificate of
the officer serving the same or by the affidavit of the person serving the same when
such service is made by a private person, or by acceptance of service filed in the
proceeding, signed by the party to be served, if not a minor. Proof of publication and
mailing shall be made in the same manner as in actions brought in the district court.
s'138 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1943).
"Id. at 1006.
. See text accompanying notes 33, 34 supra.
92 TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-207 (1956).
9368 Tenn. 386 (1876).41d. at 389.
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IV. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE USE OF MULLANE IN PROBATE
While the argument for the use of the Mullane concept of adequate
notice in probate is convincing, it is not without critics. A number of au-
thors have argued that the Mullane concept of notice is inapplicable to a
probate proceeding. 5 These advocates base their reasoning upon the his-
torical development of the common law and a number of Supreme Court
cases" which discuss the nature of a probate proceeding.
Probate is an in rem proceeding directed against property rather than
persons.97 Its purpose is to determine the interests of all persons, known or
unknown, in the res and a valid judgment in rem is considered binding on
the whole world. Even though the Court in Mullane attempted to disre-
gard the distinctions between in personam and in rem," they remain a part
of our legal system and are used frequently by courts on all levels. The
fact that probate is an in rem proceeding is used to argue that the Mul-
lane doctrine is inapplicable, but the condemnation cases appear to destroy
the force of this argument."
Another more convincing argument concerns the course of develop-
ment which American probate law has followed from its English heritage.
Jurisdiction for probate in seventeenth century England was in the ec-
clesiastical courts,"° and no notice was given of the probate of a will since
it was primarily an administrative function. The English law did, however,
provide a thirty-year period in which interested parties could come in
and contest the probate.' This basic system is still used in some states
today.' While some states have carried over the old English system intact,
others have modified it to at least provide for notice by publication prior
to probate.9 Thus, the system of notice by publication or posting has been
a part of our judicial system since colonial times.
Yet another argument that the notice provisions of the Texas Probate
Code are adequate may be founded upon the line of cases handed down
by the United States Supreme Court on this area of the law. These cases,
decided several decades ago, are the only Supreme Court decisions on pro-
bate. They all are contrary to the holding in Mullane, but no probate case
has been decided on the question of notice since Mullane.
The case of Farrell v. O'Brien,'4 decided in 1905, held that a one-year
" 2 W. PAGE, WILLS §§ 596, 597 (1941). RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 32, comment (f)
(1942); Comment, Probate Proceedings-Administration of Decedent's Estates-The Mullane Case
and Due Process of Law, 50 MICH. L. REA. 124 (1951).
96Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356 (1915); Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S.
346 (1913); Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71 (1909); Farrell v. O'brien, 199 U.S. 89 (1905); Cul-
bertson v. H. Witbeck Co., 127 U.S. 326 (1888); Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485 (1883); Kieley v.
McGlynn, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 503 (1875).
:72 W. PAGE, WILLS § 560 (1941); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS S 32 (1942).
8 See text accompanying notes 28-30 sutura.
9 See text accompanying notes 33-40 supra.
00E. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 360-63, 331-48 (2d ed. 1911);
A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, HISTORY OF WILLS 7, 101, 112 (1928); 2 W. PAGE, WILLS §§ 562,5651 (1941).11A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, HISTORY OF WILLS 159 (1928).
102 See note 3 supra.
' Simes, The Administration of a Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding in Ren, 43 MICH. L. REv.
675, 693 (1945).
10,199 U.S. 89 (1905).
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period during which a will could be contested provided adequate due pro-
cess under the fourteenth amendment. The appellant challenged the pro-
bate of a will on the ground that no notice was given as provided by the
statute. Mr. Justice White stated:
[T]he contention made on this subject amounts to asserting that every state
law which provides for a probate in common form is repugnant to the due
process clause of the constitution even though under state statutes full and
adequate remedies are provided by which interested parties during a period
of time prescribed by law, be heard in the probate proceedings to question
the existence of a will or its probate." 5
The Court had discussed this point in an earlier case,' 6 and held that the
Virginia probate notice provisions were constitutional. The dictum in this
case demonstrates that the Court assumed ex parte procedures in the area
of probate law were adequate and standard procedures.
A statute which provided for notice by publication or posting and a
one-year period to contest the probate was the subject of controversy in
In re Broderick's Will." ' There Mr. Justice Bradley stated his approval for
this statutory provision in holding: "In view of these provisions, it is diffi-
cult to conceive of a more complete and effective probate jurisdiction, or
one better calculated to attain the ends of justice and truth."'' 0 He added
that all interested parties could be notified in a probate proceeding and
that they are charged with notice because of the nature of a proceeding
in rem. Only a few years later the Court considered a Michigan case,
Culbertson v. H. Witbeck Co.,"' where an ancillary probate of a will
whose interested parties were all nonresidents was at issue. The Court, ap-
proving of notice by publication, made no distinction between residents
and nonresidents. This case is another example of notice by publication
being considered a proper method for notification of heirs and legatees.
Questions have arisen concerning the necessity for notice in each phase
of the probate proceeding. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry"' involved an ac-
counting which was required after the probate of an estate had begun. In
this case the Court held that notice given at the beginning of the pro-
ceeding was sufficient to maintain jurisdiction throughout the entire pro-
ceeding and no new notice was needed for the accounting. Several states,
however, provide for notice by publication at the various stages of pro-
bate."' At least two cases, Christianson v. King County,"' decided in 1915,
and Goodrich v. Ferris,"' decided in 1909, have held that notice by pub-
lication is sufficient in the various stages of probate. The former case in-
volved the hearing for the administrator's final accounting and the latter
involved an executor's final accounting and distribution. In the latter case
105Id. at 118.
'"° Robertson v. Pickell, 109 U.S. 608 (1883).
10788 U.S. (21 Wall.) 503 (1874).
"0 i'd. at 517.
' 127 U.S. 326 (1888).
'"0228 U.S. 346 (1913).
"' Id. at 353.
112239 U.S. 356 (1915).
"3214 U.S. 71 (1909).
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the Court held that the claim that the time for notice was unreasonable
"was clearly unsubstantial and devoid of merit. 114 These cases all add
weight to the argument that the Court has accepted the old concept that
notice in probate by publication or posting does not violate due process.
Another argument against application of the Mullane doctrine of notice
to probate proceedings is based on an 1883 Supreme Court case, Ellis v.
Davis,15 which is interesting not only for its legal concept but also for its
historical background. A Louisiana matron willed her entire estate to Jeffer-
son Davis, the former president of the Confederacy, who she said was the
"highest and noblest [man] in existence.." The heirs at law and next of
kin brought an action of revendication under Louisiana law to recover the
property devised by the decedent to Davis. The action was brought in
the federal district court in Louisiana and was not a probate proceeding,
but a proceeding to have Davis removed from the land.
The Court decided that it did not have to consider the question of juris-
diction in a probate proceeding. "This action . . . was a subject of consid-
eration in Barrow v. Hunton ... but the present is not an action of that
description, for the relief prayed for is a recovery of the possession of the
inheritance, which ... must be prosecuted in an action of revendication. 117
The suit was not an action for nullity, and the action of revendication fur-
nished a "plain, adequate and complete remedy at law and consequently
constitutes a bar to the prosecution of a bill in chancery....8
This case demonstrates a remedy at law which is available to those who
are deprived of adequate notice in a probate proceeding. These deprived
parties can bring a suit to have the party who inherited the property re-
moved from the land. Thus, the party who did not receive notice is not
without recourse. He can bring suit, not in a probate proceeding, but in a
different proceeding before a federal court. Such an approach to the issue
of procedural due process does, however, result in a multiplicity of suits.
Similarly, the necessity of bringing a separate action may be criticized as
prolonging litigation.
V. THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT PROBLEM
The various notice provisions found in the states' statutes give rise to a
problem of conflict of laws.'19 The United States Constitution provides for
full faith and credit between the states,12 8 but this provision does not pre-
clude an inquiry into the issue of the jurisdiction of the court rendering
the judgment that is sought to be enforced in the sister state. An attempt
to render a judgment without the proper jurisdiction is a violation of the
1 41Id. at 81.
... 109 U.S. 485 (1883).
"0 Id. at 488.
1 T d. at 503, citing Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. 80 (1879).
118 Id.
"OH. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAws 390-96 (1964).
120 Id. at 395; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I.
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due process clause,1 ' and the judgment is void in the state where rendered
and need not be given effect elsewhere. 2 '
If there is no jurisdiction over the subject matter, then the judgment
is void and the full faith and credit problem can be avoided. "American
cases have treated lack of competence of the court as an absence of juris-
diction over the subject matter."'23 The assumption is that if a state had
not authorized the court to assume jurisdiction over the point in litiga-
tion, the judgment will be neither enforced nor recognized.' However,
mere irregularities or errors in the rendition of a judgment fail to create
a lack of jurisdiction necessary to a defense when recognition of a judg-
ment is sought in a sister state.'
If Texas probate proceedings continue to follow the present pattern of
notice, the probate decree of a Texas court could be denied full faith and
credit in a sister state. It may be argued that the notice provision of the
Texas Probate Code"' fails to provide adequate notice in accordance with
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Consequently, the
court operating under this statute does not have jurisdiction to enter a de-
cree in probate and any subsequent decree need not be accorded full faith
and credit by sister states. Although the problem may not arise in suits
between states whose statutes are equally violative of due process, a
Michigan court would not be likely to honor a Texas decree where posting
was the method of notice used.
Another possible problem may arise concerning full faith and credit
granted to a probate decree of a sister state. "A will admitted to probate
as a valid will at the last domicile of the decedent should be conclusively
recognized as valid (as to personalty) in all other states where the de-
cedent left personalty and this is the general view of the authorities."
1
21
Some doubt exists, however, as to whether the result is imperatively de-
manded by the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. 5 The
difficulty arises when the state where the decedent was domiciled probates
a will containing a valid testamentary disposition of property under its
law and attempts to compel a second state which has actual control over
the property to accept that testamentary disposition as valid. "[T]he only
reason that an adjudication of the validity of the will at domicile is signifi-
cant in another state where the property is left, is because the state of the
situs looks to the domiciliary rules for distributing the dead man's estate.'
'
n
It appears to be entirely within the power of the state to require every
testamentary disposition of property found within its borders to be in-
121 See notes 8, 30 supra.
122See, e.g., Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U.S. 1 (1885).
"I H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 396 (1964).
124 Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873).
* Chandler v. Peketz, 297 U.S. 609 (1936).
"
5 TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. S 128(a) (1956).
'"7 See text accompanying notes 64-76 supra.
128 H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 525 (1949), and cases cited therein. The Texas case of
Barney v. Huff, 326 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), error ref. n.r.e., demonstrates how the
full faith and credit question is avoided when the testator was not domiciled in the state rendering
the probate decree.
'2 See note 9 supra.
1H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 526 (1949).
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terpreted according to its own principles. The probate of a will in a state
not the last domicile of the decedent apparently will be conclusive else-
where as to the disposition of property in that state only."' However, this
reasoning may be subject to some modification because of the Uniform
Probate Code.'3
VI. CONCLUSION
The Texas Probate Code contains an outmoded, obsolete notice provi-
sion. The idea that notice can be adequately given by posting an announce-
ment on a courthouse door is fallacious and unreasonable. Yet, the leading
Texas cases... apply the statute as it is stated on its face and the consti-
tutionality of the provision has never been severely tested. While Texas is
not alone in its approach, it has failed to recognize modern developments
in the concept of due process. Other states have made the same mistake,
but most of these have sought to distinguish their concept of notice in
probate from the standard of reasonableness and best possible notice as set
forth in the Mullane decision.
The best argument against the use of Mullane in probate is the line of
Supreme Court decisions"3 4 which have considered probate notice provisions
akin to the Texas provision and found them to be constitutional. While
none of these decisions is recent, they are the only decisions from the High
Court concerning probate notice statutes. The Court has not considered the
issue of probate notice provisions since the Mullane decision. The prior
decisions on probate notice would seem overruled by Armstrong,3 since
they all stress the fact that a period is allowed for contest even though
improper notice is given. The Armstrong case held that the burden of
proof shifts, just as in probate, and thus there is an actual deprivation of
due process.
The three other arguments against the use of the Mullane standard in
probate are answerable. The in rem nature of the proceeding does not
seem a valid distinction in light of the statement in the leading case to the
effect that such distinctions should no longer exist; yet they still appear in
many judicial opinions. Secondly, the historical argument can be answered
simply by comparing modern America with seventeenth century England;
people move at a faster pace with greater mobility. Finally, the argument
based on the Barrow. and Ellis'3 cases also lacks strength. Although a
party who was not given notice is not without a remedy in a court of
law, the argument loses weight when taken in light of the fact that this
remedy creates a necessity for a multiplicity of litigation, a problem our
courts have sought to avoid.
Mullane was decided on a sound basis of prior Supreme Court decisions."'
s' Id. at 526, citing In re Clark's Estate, 148 Cal. 108, 82 P. 760 (1964).
13' UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 96.
1 See text accompanying notes 52-60 supra.
134 See note 96 supra.
'3 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
136 Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. 80 (1879).
13. Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485 (1883).
.. See notes 10, 15 supra.
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It set standards of notice that are both fair and realistic to all the parties
concerned. The Mullane doctrine has been carried forward in later cases to
a point where the holding permeates most areas of the law. One excep-
tion appears to be the probate proceeding. Perhaps the reason is because so
many states today possess constitutional notice provisions in their probate
codes. Another possibility is that few parties in states where the constitu-
tional standard is not met have come forward to question the validity of
the provision. The Supreme Court has stated that it "has not committed
itself to any formula ...determining when constructive notice may be
utilized or what tests it must meet."1 ' There is presently no set formula of
what constitutes due process of law. In some areas of the law one standard
is used and in others a different position may be taken. However, if a for-
mula does exist it can be found in Mullane, and such a formula would pro-
vide clarity and certainly overshadow any loss in flexibility. The new idea
adopted by the Court provides a new standard superior to the old one. To
distinguish cases because of the area of the law in which they are found
is to vary a stable formula.1"
Thus, it appears the arguments for the use of the Mullane doctrine in
probate by far outweigh those against it. States which follow the decision
should not have to honor the decrees of the probate courts of sister states
which do not provide adequate notice. In the situation where a state gives
full faith and credit to a decree based on an invalid statute, the remedy lies
in the United States Supreme Court. The only question left is how long it
will be before this relic of another era will be challenged. Perhaps its
demise is not too far in the future, for in an age when men can travel to
the moon, it seems trivial to ask for a letter to be sent through the mail.
"a Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
"'Note, Constitutional Law: Adequacy of Notice for Due Process: Section 100(c) of the
New York Banking Law, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 541, 547 (1951).
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